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A conceptual treadmill: the need for `middle ground' in clinical decision
making theory in nursing
This paper explores the two predominant theoretical approaches to the process
of nurse decision making prevalent within the nursing research literature:
systematic-positivistic approaches as exempli®ed by information processing
theory, and the intuitive-humanistic approach of Patricia Benner. The two
approaches' strengths and weaknesses are explored and as a result a third
theoretical stance is proffered: the idea of a cognitive continuum. According to
this approach the systematic and intuitive theoretical camps occupy polar
positions at either end of a continuum as opposed to separate theoretical planes.
The methodological and professional bene®ts of adopting such a stance are also
brie¯y outlined.
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INTRODUCTION: THE SEMANTICS OF NURSE
DECISION MAKING
In relation to the examination of decision making in
nursing a number of expressions are used by authors to
describe what is, in essence, the same phenomenon:
decisions taken by nurses relating directly to issues of
nursing diagnosis or intervention in clinical settings.
Clinical decision making is the most common term used
(Ford 1979, Field 1987, Luker & Kenrick 1992) but other
terms utilized include clinical judgement (Benner &
Tanner 1987, Itano 1989), clinical inference (Hammond
1964), clinical reasoning (Grobe et al. 1991) and diag-
nostic reasoning (Carnevali et al. 1984, Radwin 1990). To
all intents and purposes these terms are interchangeable
given they describe a single process, namely, the `opera-
tionalisation of nursing knowledge' (Luker & Kenrick 1992
p. 458). The stance that nursing decisions represent the
operational face of nursing knowledge is the one adopted
by this paper. However, as will be demonstrated later, the
operationalization of knowledge is no monotonic or linear
equation along the lines of:
[scienti®c] knowledge + clinical challenge + registered practi-
tioner  uniformly optimal decision
An alternative way of viewing the subtle differences in
descriptions of the same process is to recognize that terms
such as clinical diagnosis represent the process of
decision making and also the outcome of this process
(Carpenito 1983, Gordon 1987). This paper explores theory
on decision making as a process. The paper, and the study
with which it is associated, do not seek to judge the quality
of decisions reached, or whether the decisions are better or
worse for different nurses using different decision making
models. There are two reasons why deploying such an
approach would be methodologically unwise.
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First, studies seeking to examine the outcomes of deci-
sions often depend on the implicit assumption that `good'
equals `accurate' (Tanner et al. 1987, Hamers et al. 1994).
This is problematic for nursing as we do not yet know what
constitutes an `accurate' nursing diagnosis or intervention-
decision. For example, would an accurate decision be one
which most nurses (however ill-informed) would take?
One which is best supported by scienti®cally rigorous and
generalizable research ®ndings? Or one which best
balances the needs of the nurse, available resources and
the end-user? All of these could be taken legitimately as
`accurate' decisions but each could conceivably be very
different both in terms of process and outcome.
This ¯aw is compounded by the second reason for
rejecting a comparative approach, namely, the lack of
consensus regarding nursing diagnoses themselves.
Nursing lacks an internationally recognized database of
nursing diagnoses such as that used in medicine in
specialities such as psychiatry. Moreover, little, if
anything, is known about the correlation between
information, the cues used to guide decisions, and the
diagnoses or decisions reached. Clearly then without
greater knowledge of the outcomes of decisions and a
demonstrable (or at least visible) degree of consensus
amongst practitioners regarding nursing diagnoses such
an approach would be ill-advised. However, these limita-
tions do not prevent the exploration of the processes
involved in decision making.
Despite the lack of linguistic homogeneity, a variety of
models of decision making in nursing, both normative and
descriptive, have been advanced. These models fall into
two discrete theoretical categories: the systematic-posi-
tivist and the intuitive-humanist.
THE SYSTEMATIC-POSITIVIST STANCE
ON DECISION MAKING
The dominant explanatory stances on nurse decision
making until the 1980s were models portraying decision
making as a hypethetico-deductive rational process based
around theory derived from the ®eld of cognitive psycho-
logy. A number of in¯uential studies took the issue of
nurse decision making and explicitly or implicitly sought
to examine it from the perspective of what will be termed
the Information Processing Model (Cianfrani 1984).
The information processing model
The central assumption behind the model is that the
human decision system can be separated into two compo-
nents: short- and long-term memory. Short-term memory
houses the stimuli information required to `unlock' factual
(semantic) and experimental (episodic) knowledge
stored in long-term memory (Carnevali et al. 1984, Hamers
et al. 1994). The interface between these two cognitive
databases is represented by a four-stage process (Radwin
1990, Hamers et al. 1994).
First, the clinician takes part in a patient encounter and
gathers preliminary clinical information about the patient
(also called the cue acquisition stage). This information
can also be gathered prior to patient encounter.
Following this the clinician generates initial, tentative,
hypotheses. These are related to gathered data and short-
term memory-based cues. The number of hypotheses
generated is generally estimated as being limited to
between four and six.
The third stage (interpretation) involves the clinician
interpreting the cues gathered during the acquisition stage
and classifying them as either con®rming, refuting or not
contributing to the initial hypotheses generated.
Using this classi®cation, the ®nal evaluatory stage
involves the clinician weighing up the pros and cons of
each decision alternative and choosing the one favoured
by the preponderance of the evidence.
This basic sequential hypothetico-deductive model has
been used as the basis for more elaborate schemata; but
despite increasing complexity the basic stages remain. For
example, Carnevali (1984) describes a seven-stage process
of diagnostic reasoning in nursing which simply breaks
down the basic four-stage model described thus far:
1 Exposure to pre encounter data.
2 Entry to the data search ®eld and shaping the direction
of data gathering.
3 Coalescing of cues into clusters or `chunks'.
4 Activating possible diagnostic explanations (hypoth-
eses).
5 Hypothesis and data directed search of the data ®eld.
6 Testing diagnostic hypothesis for goodness of ®t.
7 Diagnosis.
A number of studies have attempted to go beyond the
somewhat vague assertion that nurses simply weigh up
the `pros and cons' of decision alternatives and have
tested the hypothesis that nurses draw on formal or
informal (i.e. known or estimated) probability estimates of
`diagnostic ®t' as well as contextual data in making
clinical decisions. Speci®cally, a number of authors have
utilized Bayesian and/or probability theory to examine the
clinical decision making of nurses (Hammond et al. 1967,
Aspinall 1979, Panniers & Kellogg-Walker 1994).
Bayesian logic in nurses' decision making?
Bayes' theorem, expressed mathematically, argues that:
ProbH/E  ProbH  ProbE/H=ProbE
The signi®cance of Bayes' theorem to a discussion of
clinical decision making comes when this equation is
unpacked. Simply stated, Bayes' theorem argues that
people hold degrees of belief in relation to scienti®c
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theories or outcomes (or indeed any phenomenon). More-
over, these degrees of belief will be adjusted in response to
the presentation of new probability-evidence (Papineau
1996), to the extent that the practitioner considers E likely
given H, but unlikely otherwise. For example, suppose
that H is the hypothesis held by the practitioner and E is
some new evidence relating to the hypothesis then the
theorem dictates that upon discovering the evidence
the practitioner will adjust their degree of belief in the
hypothesis in line with the right hand side of the equation.
Expressed alternatively, if the evidence (E) is very
surprising or enlightening (for example, that the use of
compression bandaging signi®cantly decreases healing
time for venous leg ulcers) but is in line with the theory
adopted (H Ð that compression bandaging appears to be
bene®cial in the patients that you treat for leg ulceration)
then it should make you increase your belief in (H). The
corollary being that if the evidence is no more likely given
H than it would be according to any other theory then the
presence of E provides no more support for H and beliefs
should be adjusted accordingly (Papineau 1996 pp. 295±
296). The currency of Bayes' theorem therefore is proba-
bility relating to nursing evidence and hypotheses.
Hammond et al. (1967), in what was probably the ®rst
signi®cant strand of nurse decision making research,
examined the ways in which six nurses revised their
diagnoses of patients' conditions as new data were gath-
ered and presented. These revised hypotheses and diag-
noses were then compared with calculated probabilities of
the conditions. Whilst consistently reviewing their
hypotheses, nurses tended to be `cognitively cautious' in
their revisions. That is, they were not as revisionist as the
Bayesian model of decision making would suggest.
Aspinall (1979) took this approach further and found
that a structured decision modelling tool (a decision tree)
based on calculated probabilities helped nurses to reach
`correct' diagnostic decisions. Panniers and Kellogg-
Walker (1994), however, using a similar approach (though
different research methods) found that nurses' intuitive
decisions and those promoted by a tool based on calcu-
lated probabilities were signi®cantly different. Speci®-
cally, in relation to wound dressings there was only a 35%
level of agreement between qualitative judgement and
quantitative evidence-led prescriptions (Panniers &
Kellogg-Walker 1994), although it is worth noting that in
the absence of treatment outcome data (and associated
probabilities) the quantitatively `correct' decisions in this
study were not necessarily the optimal ones in terms of
clinical effectiveness. Instead, the work focused on the
probabilities of variables such as nurses' knowledge of the
product, patient comfort, risk of adverse effects and costs.
It is clear that the Bayesian annex of the systematic-
positivist strand of decision making is more prescriptive
than descriptive. Bayesian models and studies examining
their utility offer the potential for improving decision
making rather than describing the reality of clinical
practice. This is a criticism which is levelled at the
information processing model generally; namely, that the
linear sequential implications of the model are not
observed in practice. Nurses frequently overlap stages in
the process and change their order (Lauri 1982, Jenkins
1985, Corcoran 1986,). Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983)
present a useful overview of the theory of Bayesian logic
in relation to systematic perspectives on cognition and
also point out the limitations of the theory in the `real
world' of clinical practice. This lack of descriptive `®t' is
the basis for the competing, intuitive-humanist, alterna-
tive model of clinical decision making.
THE INTUITIVE-HUMANIST STANCE
ON DECISION MAKING
Just as there is a lack of consensus over the terms used to
describe decision making, the lack of consensus
surrounding descriptions of the role of intuition in clinical
decision making mitigates against an easy summary of the
relevant literature in this area. The various approaches to
de®ning intuition include:
· `Understanding without a rationale' (Benner & Tanner
1987 p. 23).
· `A perception of possibilities, meanings and relation-
ships by way of insight' (Gerrity 1987 p. 63).
· `Knowledge of a fact or truth, as a whole; immediate
possession of knowledge; and knowledge independent
of the linear reasoning process' (Rew & Barron 1987
p. 60).
· `Immediate knowing of something without the
conscious use of reason' (Schrader & Fischer 1987 p. 45).
· `[A] ¼ process whereby the nurse knows something
about a patient that cannot be verbalized, that is
verbalized with dif®culty or for which the source of
knowledge cannot be determined. (Young 1987 p. 52).
The author most attributed with developing the intu-
itive model and the distinction between theoretical know-
ledge and experiential knowledge is Patricia Benner
(1984). Her work has been hugely in¯uential in the
preparation of trainee nurses (Luker & Kenrick 1992) and
offers a useful theoretical counter to the empiricism
associated with the information processing model. The
basic thrust of all intuitive-humanist models is that
intuitive judgement distinguishes the expert from the
novice, with the expert no longer relying on analytical
principles to connect their understanding of the situation
to appropriate action. Nursing appears intuitive to the
outside observer and feels internalized within the practi-
tioner; clinical decisions are the result of an almost
unconscious level of cognition (Hamers et al. 1994).
In common with others, McKenna makes the analytical
distinction between `know how' and `know that'
C. Thompson
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knowledge. `Know how' knowledge is that which is skills
based, rooted in intuition and often relates to the `art' of
nursing. `Know that' knowledge, on the other hand, is
grounded in theory and empirical research and often
classi®ed as responsible for the `science' of nursing
(McKenna 1997). For McKenna, Benner's work contributes
®rmly to the `know how' knowledge base of nursing or
nursing as art. For Benner herself, however, such a classi-
®cation is unforthcoming, as for her nursing constitutes a
practice rather than an art (Bishop & Scudder 1997).
The primary distinction between systematic-rational
and intuitive approaches lies in their respective motiva-
tional loci. In the systematic approach of the information
processing model the prime motivators in any decision are
its related task-features: the number of cues, the task
complexity, etc. In the intuitive approach of Benner and
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) Ð on which Benner's work is
based Ð the shaping force in any decision is the individual
making it. Good decisions are those made intuitively by
professionals with expertise, such expertise representing
the end-point of a ®ve-stage sequential transformation
from novice to expert:
1 Novice: those with no experience of situations in which
they are expected to perform and who ®nd themselves
governed by context-free rules as guides to action.
2 Advanced beginners: those who demonstrate margin-
ally acceptable performance and have amassed enough
experience to recognize recurring meaning in the
situations they are involved in.
3 Competent: those who see their actions as part of a
longer-term plan which helps achieve ef®ciency and
organization in work.
4 Pro®cient: the practitioner begins to perceive things as
a whole with speedy alterations to the long-term plans
when expected normal patterns of care do not present
themselves.
5 Expert: one who has no reliance on guiding rules or
maxims and who has an intuitive grasp of situations;
only falling back on hypethetico-deductive logic when
a new or unexpected challenge arises.
THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF
THEORETICAL DECISION MAKING MODELS
Both the systematic-positivist and the intuitive-humanist
stance have a number of strengths and limitations. These
can be separated into four themes: communicability;
simpli®cation; context speci®city; and applicability.
Communicability
Knowing can only become shared knowledge when it is
communicated to others (McKenna 1997) and herein lies
the problem for intuitive models: it is almost impossible to
communicate something which is intangible and which
the practitioner is unable to express. Given that the
intuitive model exempli®ed by Benner and her acolytes
relies on experiential knowledge as the basis for `knowing'
as opposed to the science of communicable research
®ndings, it is dif®cult to imagine a scenario where
nursing's knowledge base becomes a shared resource
available to all practitioners equally. One could argue
that the intangible `character' of nursing is often passed
from expert to novice through observation and a form of
physical apprenticeship, but this still begs the question,
how does the novice know whether their interpretation of
the intangible is an appropriate one? This is particularly
so when one considers that certain kinds of clinical
experience and the decisions that accompany them are
something of a `scarce resource' for students, with all the
accompanying limitations on opportunities for knowledge
reinforcement that follow.
Systematic-rational, hypothetico-deductive, models are
not without their problems in this regard, however.
Whilst undoubtedly promoting communicability
(through transparency) in the decision making process,
the use of knowledge, and the reproduction of that
knowledge, the process itself may not be that relevant if,
as appears to be the case, it does not `®t' with the reality
of clinical practice. Lauri and SalanteraÈ (1995), using a
factor-analytical approach, found evidence that both
Benner's intuitive model and the hypothetico-deductive
approach of information processing had a degree of
analytical utility in explaining the decision making of
nurses. The implication was that both have something to
offer and that neither one offers a unitary solution to
explaining decision making in the complex arena of
practice. The importance of this pluralistic explanation
is highlighted later in the paper when the idea of a
cognitive continuum is introduced.
Simpli®cation
Linked to this realization is the problem of simpli®cation
or reductionism. If the information processing model is
failing to capture all the variables involved in decision
making and clinical diagnosis (McGuire 1985) and at the
same time communicating this `incomplete' picture to
other practitioners in the form of scienti®c `evidence' then
nursing's knowledge base will continue to develop in an
ad hoc manner with signi®cant gaps in the total picture.
The intuitive model of expertise and decision making at
least allows for the complexity of decisions allied to
health care provision and recognizes that health is more
than the sum of its constituent parts. More importantly
intuitive expertise-based approaches recognize that
nursing as a verb is more than the sum of a series of
physical, social and spiritual interventions carried out on
the patient. However, if the profession relies on holistic
Nursing theory and concept development or analysis Clinical decision making theory
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`intuitive' forms of knowing in its practitioners as the
basis for practice then, whilst undoubtedly allowing for
the complexity of the work, nursing decisions will remain
an opaque activity unable to be in¯uenced by anyone
other than nurses, thereby representing perhaps the ulti-
mate form of occupational closure!
Context speci®city
Crow and colleagues (1995) point to the importance of
practice context to decision making Ð although they
prefer the more formal term domain-speci®c knowledge
structures. For Crow, contexts such as occupation and
clinical specialty are seen as signi®cant determinants of
decision making. These domain [context] speci®c know-
ledge structures:
¼ specify what action to take and can be best described as ways of
thinking about problems met in everyday practice. For example,
nurses experienced in looking after patients with diabetes may
judge whether the patient's condition is stable very differently
from nurses experienced in looking after patients with a myocar-
dial infarction.
(Crow et al. 1995 p. 208)
Crow points to three studies (Prescott et al. 1989, Marks
et al. 1991, Javacone & Dostal 1992) as evidence of the
importance of such domains to the decisions made by
nurses. The importance of domain or context, however, is
not treated equally by the two camps of clinical decision
making theory. The systematic-positivist approach to
decision making can be criticized because it includes an
implicit assumption that judgement is the result of a
unitary generic process used by all clinicians at all times
(Berner 1984). The intuitive-humanist approach can be
criticized for the opposite reason; namely, because of its
axiom that each clinical challenge is unique, and the
processes and inputs used subjective, then it is almost
entirely context-speci®c and transferability of `intuition'
between different practitioners becomes impossible
(Radwin 1990).
Applicability
Whilst both the systematic-positivist model of information
processing and the intuitive-humanist approach are
presented in the literature as descriptive models (i.e. they
describe how decisions are made rather than how deci-
sions ought to be made) there appears little to convince
the author that either offers a unitary solution to the
problems of researching clinical decision making in
nursing. A number of commentators highlight the fact
that most studies are characterized by decision making
models which represent a `middle way' Ð combinations
of intuition, explicit data gathering, and tangible expla-
nation and intangible `knowing'. For example, Philips and
Rempushki (1985) found that whilst decision making was
grounded in the acquisition of data it was far from the
linear progression assumed by the hypothetico-deductive
model generally. Smith (1988) found that intuition or `gut
instinct' was often combined with `objective' data as well
as subjective variables such as nurse experience and
familiarity with the patient.
A DECISION MAKING CONTINUUM?
There is little to convince this researcher that either the
humanistic-intuitive approach or the systematic-rational
approach offers a solely convincing basis for explaining
decision making and by implication the information used
as the basis for nursing decisions. A more appropriate
stance might be to recognize that each has something
to offer and that in their theoretically `pure' states
they represent ideal-typical frameworks for analysis.
Certainly, White et al. (1992) found in their study that
whilst hypothetico-deductive models were applied the
end-result was a decision making model which possessed
the characteristics of both models:
[The study ®ndings] ¼ indicate that the hypothetico-deductive
process of clinical decision making was applied¼ the differ-
ence¼ in the time spent working through the simulations and
in the amount of subjective data acquired also is consistent
with evolving cognitive models which indicate that ef®ciency
in clustering information develops with experience in a given
setting or with speci®c presentations. This supports the ®nd-
ings of Benner that expert nurses¼ move ahead more quickly
and on the basis of less subjective data than novice nurses.
(White et al. 1992 p. 157)
Similarly, in their work on learning to use scienti®c
knowledge in education and practice settings (in a British
context) Eraut and colleagues (1995) argue that systematic-
rational approaches alone fail to explain advanced levels
of clinical performance. However, they add the caveat that
the intuitive models of Benner and the Dreyfusses are
often idealized rather than researched and that profes-
sional deliberations are usually mixtures of intuitive and
analytical processes.
With these points in mind it is appropriate to view both
models as ideal typical end-points on a continuum of
clinical decision making, particularly as there is so little
empirical material to draw on, and that which is presented
throws up contradictory themes and mixed messages. This
view of a `cognitive continuum' in relation to clinical
decision making is supported by Hamm (1988). His analysis
is based ®rmly in medicine, but the key points apply equally
to an analysis of nursing practice. For Hamm, practitioner
cognition is neither purely intuitive nor purely analytical,
rather it is commonly located at some point in between
(Hamm 1988 p. 82). For example, the expert community
practitioner will, in the delivery of care:
C. Thompson
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· Exhibit elegant and logical use of diagnostic and
decision making skills and expected probabilities in
selecting products for use on a patients with wounds
(rational-analytic thought).
· Know intuitively when to refer a patient to another
member of the multidisciplinary health care team after
just a few introductory questions and an assessment
when faced with a patient with a leg ulcer (intuitive
cognition).
· In the course of teaching juniors, steer them in the
assessment of the presenting features of a given patient
using their own judgements and perceptions as a
framework (a combination of both Ð quasi rational
cognition).
According to the cognitive continuum theory the major
determinants of whether a practitioner utilizes a rational
or intuitive approach to decision making are primarily
determined by the position of the task on a continuum
which has three dimensions (Hamm 1988 p. 83):
1 Complexity of task structure.
1.1 Number of cues Ð when presented with lots of
information a practitioner will probably utilize an
intuitive approach.
1.2 Redundancy of cues Ð the more cues help in the
prediction of the presence of other cues then the
more likely that intuitive cognition will be used.
1.3 The nature of an organizing principle Ð if a simple
`averaging' approach to combining information is
known to be more accurate then intuitive thought
is likely to be a feature. If it is known that a
complicated approach to combining evidence
produces more accurate answers then this will
induce an analytical approach.
2 Ambiguity of the task
2.1 Whether an organizing principle exists Ð if an
organizing principle exists then the practitioner is
more likely to be analytical.
2.2 Familiarity of the task Ð unfamiliarity induces an
intuitive approach as the practitioner has not had
time to develop more complicated ways of dealing
with cue information.
2.3 The potential for accuracy Ð if a particular
approach to assessment is known to be accurate
(even if only perceived as such) then it is more
likely to be used as the basis for analysis. For
example, universal assessment scales for pressure
sore assessment.
3 Nature of the presentation of the task
3.1 Task decomposition Ð if the task leads to the need
to address related sub-tasks then analytic modes of
thought will be used.
3.2 The ways in which information is presented Ð if
visual information is used then intuition is
induced. If the information is presented as
objective and quantitative then analysis is
commonly a feature.
3.3 Time available Ð the shorter the available time the
more likely that intuitive approaches will be
adopted.
However, where the cognitive continuum theory
departs from the `cold' rationality of the information
processing model is in its encompassing of the variables
of power, social structure and individual knowledge
(Hamm 1988 p. 84). As a framework for researching
nurse decision making the theory allows for the realiza-
tion that multidisciplinary team members will accept
analytical thinking from people who are broadly
perceived as competent, able to eliminate uncertainty,
and familiar: often those `experts' in senior clinical
positions. Similarly practitioners may reject intuitive
solutions from `junior' colleagues where analytical
reasoning cannot be demonstrated. Clearly, this suggests
that variables such as an individual's position in the
structures and hierarchies in a work environment will
exert some sway on the organizing cognitive principles
available for them to deploy.
Similarly, the relationship between individual know-
ledge and cognitive modes is signi®cant; as Hamm points
out, `the ability of a task thinker to induce a mode of
cognition depends [also] on what the thinker knows'
(Hamm 1988 p. 84). For example, if a practitioner does not
know that there are sound scienti®c principles behind the
selection of wound care products, then a wound-based
`task feature' will not encourage analytical cognition in
dealing with wound data.
The fact that issues of social structure and levels of
knowledge variation amongst practitioners can be incor-
porated into any analysis is an attractive aspect of the
theory. From a researcher's perspective this allows nurse
decision making to be brought into analytical and meth-
odological frameworks which view nursing as a form of
social action, with the attendant emphasis on questions of
culture, values, interests and power that accompany such
perspectives.
CONCLUSION
The nursing literature commonly separates decision
making into one of two theoretical camps: the system-
atic-positivist approach (as typi®ed by information
processing theory), and the intuitive-humanist stance
of Benner and the Dreyfusses. However, neither of these
two positions offer a unitary theory able to reconcile the
apparently different worlds of normative theory and
clinical reality. An alternative approach is to accept
that, whilst conceptually distinctive, the two approaches
occupy the same theoretical plane. Speci®cally,
the systematic-positivistic stance of the information
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processing-based approaches and the intuitive-human-
istic stance of Benner represent poles at either end of a
cognitive continuum.
The promotion of the two approaches as poles on a
continuum rather than diametrically opposed entities is
not simply some theoretical `opt out' or a simple method-
ological `middle-way'. It is a solution which recognizes
the diversity of individual cognitive strategy and, more
importantly, lends itself to the theoretical development
and empirical testing of decision support systems which
assist the clinician in reaching decisions able to cope with
the plurality of modern clinical practice. This is an
important point as, in respect of the Benner/Dreyfus
models, such supporting empirical enquiry is not a
dominant feature of the literature. Such quantitative
evidence of the explanatory as well as normative power
of the humanistic-intuitive approach to decision making
for nursing would greatly add to the utility of the theory
for the profession.
Whilst not wishing to introduce the quantitative/qual-
itative evidence debate into the paper at such a late stage,
it is worth noting that the decisions nurses make, the
processes behind them and the outcomes they produce are
intricately linked to nursing's professionalization `project'
Ð i.e. the broader struggle to be seen as a professional
occupational group. Good quality, generalizable and
analytically transparent evidence of the applicability of
Benner's ideas to nursing practice would do much to
convince those concerned with nurses' decision making of
the value of this vital member of the health care team,
particularly as the qualitative studies often used as a
means of `demonstrating' the theory can be criticized for
further mystifying professional practice and ultimately
serving as literary tools supporting attempts at occupa-
tional closure. By acknowledging that unitary decision
theories are limited in their methodological usefulness to
the researcher of nursing practice and decisions, then
more elegant Ð and more importantly, transparent Ð
research solutions can be advanced. This has to be to the
bene®t of all and not just those who are intuitively `in the
know'.
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